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Summary  findings
Most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on  The policy implications of their argument are quite
growth have focused on redistribution.  However,  distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces
empirical investigation has not substantiated either the  growth by increasing pressures for redistribution.
positive association of income inequality with  If redistributive policies per se were to blame for the
redistribution or the negative association of  low growth resulting from inequality, governments that
redistribution with economic growth.  seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably
Keefer and Knack analyze the effects of inequality in  confront a tradeoff between equity and growth.
the broader context of social polarization. They argue  If, on the other hand, the insecurity of property rights
that social polarization, whether  rooted in income  slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies,
inequality or in ethnic tension, makes large changes in  governments that commit over the long run to particular
current policies (including those guaranteeing the  redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic
security of contract and property rights) more likely  growth. Fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may
under a wide range of institutional arrangements. The  actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political
resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual  uncertainty.
environment hinder growth.
They find strong empirical support for both parts of
this argument.
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pkeefer@worldbank.org  sknack@worldbank.orgThere is a general consensus that the effects of social polarization on economic
and political development are likely to be significant.  Charting the exact path of its
influence has been difficult, however.  One strand of research argues that polarized
societies find it difficult to reach political consensus on appropriate responses to crisis.  A
second research focus has been on redistribution.  Inquiry into the relationship between
income-based polarization (income inequality) and economic growth, for example, has a
long history.  It focuses on the question, does income inequality stifle growth by
increasing political incentives to redistribute? However, empirical investigation has
substantiated neither the association of income inequality with redistribution, nor a
negative association of redistribution with economic growth.'
In this paper, we attempt to advance understanding of social polarization and
political and economic outcomes in several ways.  First, we point to a substantially
different channel through which polarization might affect economic outcomes.  The
literature on polarization commonly assumes that political decisions are made on a single
policy dimension.  We relax this assumption and draw on results from the social choice
literature suggesting that increasing polarization reduces the stability of government
decisions, and in particular increases the possibility of future extreme deviations from
current government policies.  The argument we introduce and empirically investigate here
is that economic actors react to this uncertainty by reducing the scope of their activities,
arranging their businesses so they are less exposed to risk, and investing in inherently less
risky enterprises (where their investments can be easily withdrawn or shifted to other
activities).  These reactions slow the rate of economic growth.
Data issues have plagued cross-country investigations of social polarization.  The
second contribution of this paper, therefore, is to assess the usefulness of several
commonly used polarization measures, including the best available cross-country
For a review  of this literature,  see Benabou  (1996). Also  see the discussion  in Helliwell  (1994).
Imeasure  of income inequality,  in the light of a theoretically-derived  "ideal" indicator  of
polarization. The third contribution  of the paper is to use these several  measures  of social
polarization  to test two claims  that emerge  from our earlier argument: first, that
polarization  makes  the policy  environment  less stable,  particularly  by increasing  the
likelihood  of extreme  deviations  from current  policy; and second,  that it is because  of this
effect  that polarization  depresses  economic  growth.
One way  to test the first claim  is to ask whether  property  and contractual  rights
are less secure  in more  polarized  societies. That is, we expect  that current  government
policies  protecting  property  and contractual  rights, like all other  government  policies,  are
more likely  to change  drastically  if polarization  is higher. In fact, the evidence  presented
below  strongly  suggests  a negative  relationship  between  polarization  and the security  of
property  and contractual  rights.
The second  claim  is that polarization  slows  growth  because  it makes the policy
environment  less secure. We test this claim  by reexamining  the impact  of inequality  -
one type of polarization  - on growth. Several  recent  cross-country  empirical  studies  have
found  that inequality  reduces  economic  growth. 2 There are four channels  through  which
this effect  is supposed  to occur: inequality  reduces  access  to credit  markets;  it reduces
opportunities  to achieve  economies  of scale for manufacturers  who sell to the middle
class;  it increases  redistribution  through  government  budgets;  and it increases  political
violence. Each of these in turn reduces  growth. We review  evidence  that shows  these to
be incomplete  explanations  of the link from inequality  to growth,  and then explore  the
fifth channel  that emerges  from the arguments  of this paper. Since  inequality  is a form of
polarization,  income inequality  should  reduce  growth  by making property  rights less
secure. Our empirical  tests provide support  for this hypothesis.
2 For exanple,  Clarke (1995), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994).
2Polarization and the multidimensionality of political decision making
The literature offers several ways to think about the effects of polarization on
decision making.  One problem identified by researchers is the contribution of
polarization to government delay in responding to crisis.  The assumption in this work is
that two groups must agree to policy change; their preferences over the policy differ.
Each group has imperfect knowledge about the cost that the other group bears in the
event that a particular policy change is delayed, or about the likelihood that the other
group will behave cooperatively (e.g., Alesina and Drazen, 1991 or Rodrik, 1999).  The
greater the differences between the two groups, and the greater the uncertainty about the
other group, the larger are the gains to stubbornness, or continued disagreement about
collective decisions. This literature then concludes that polarization impedes the
formation of consensus to change policy.  As a consequence, exogenous shocks trigger
large swings in economic outcomes, because government policy makers cannot agree on
any compensating policy changes.
Svensson (1998) investigates a second potential consequence of polarization, that
it leads governments to underinvest in legal infrastructure.  He also assumes that there are
two sets of interests - parties - that have different preferences over government spending.
However, only one party governs at a time, so policy change does not require the
agreement of both.  In his two-period model, the government party in the first period has
some exogenously-given probability of not being re-elected.  It decides how much to
invest in the legal system.  This investment increases tax revenues in the second period,
but not the first.  Consequently, the greater the probability that the party will not be re-
elected, the less likely that it will benefit from the enhanced second period revenues.  The
greater the polarization of preferences between the two parties, the more likely that the
other party, once in office, will spend increased resources in ways that the first party finds
objectionable.  Consequently, the greater is polarization and instability, the lower is
spending on the legal system in the first period.
3Like Svensson, we are concerned with the impact of polarization on the security
of property rights.  We characterize property rights somewhat differently though, to
maintain consistency with the property rights data that we employ in the second part of
the paper.  This data assesses the risk that governments will repudiate contracts with
firms or in other ways make decisions that have the effect of devaluing firm assets.
Insecure environments, then, are those where governments are more likely to make large
departures from previous commitments to firms.
The question that concerns us here, then, is whether polarization makes large
departures more likely.  It is easy to see that this is the case under the specific
institutional assumptions of Svensson:  expropriation increases government revenues in
the current period at the expense of revenues in the second period, and is therefore more
likely when a party with different preferences over governnent  spending is expected to
govern in the second period.  Can these conclusions be generalized to an institutional
setting where multiple decision makers have a voice in government policy?
A few key results from the social choice literature suggest that, in fact,
polarization can increase instability in government policy making even when there are
multiple decision makers.  This result, however, depends on relaxing the assumption that
government policy making takes place on only one policy dimension. With a single
policy dimension, convex preferences, and an odd number of decision makers, Black's
(1958) famous median voter theorem shows that there exists a unique policy x'  that
defeats all other policy proposals xe X, where Xis the one-dimensional policy space. In
such an environment, polarization has no long-run effect on the decision to move to x',
although the information asymmetries noted previously may delay this shift.
Equilibrium outcomes are more difficult to characterize when one assumes, more
realistically, that there are multiple voters or decision makers (more than two) who use a
majoritarian decision making rule and who have conflicting preferences.  Decision
making under these conditions is marked by instability, since it is nearly always possible
4to find at least one policy proposal that a majority of voters will prefer to any other policy
(Plott, 1967 and Davis, DeGroot and Hinich, 1972). More importantly, the policy space
is not bounded, and any policy outcome is theoretically possible (McKelvey, 1976).
Relative to the unidimensional world, then, when there are multiple policy dimensions,
current policies are more likely to be changed and those changes can be larger.
Generating equilibrium outcomes from this decision making environment is the
focus of a large literature, which offers several approaches. Polarization affects the
equilibrium outcomes under each of these approaches. One set of analyses focuses on
institutions that limit the extent to which decision makers can propose and vote on new
policies, making departures from the status quo more difficult.  Shepsle and Weingast
(1981) label the equilibrium policies generated in the presence of such institutions as
"structure-induced equilibria".  There are a plethora of institutional restrictions on
collective decision making that are observed in practice.  A rule of unanimity creates
stability by ensuring that no policy is changed unless all decision makers agree.  This is
the rule assumed in the crisis and polarization literature discussed earlier.  A requirement
to make decisions one issue at a time reduces instability by foreclosing the possibility of
cycling among different policy proposals.  Constitutional restrictions that limit the set of
decision makers or that prohibit certain decisions (e.g., those that deprive individuals of
property or liberty) also impose stability.
However, increasing polarization creates pressures to replace or to bypass all of
these institutional arrangements, with a consequent increase in the magnitude of potential
departures from the status quo. 3 There are many examples of this.  Binder (1995), for
example, demonstrates that when partisan differences between the Federalists and
Republicans widened, the majority Republicans voted to overturn rules that gave
3 For example,  the greater is  polarization,  the more likely  is logrolling  that defeats  the issue-by-issue  rule,
as in Shepsle and Weingast (1981).
5minority parties in the House substantial influence over legislation.  In the context of the
argument in this paper, such rules ensured that large divergences in policy from one
government to the next would be more difficult; the rule change made it more likely that
the Republican majority in one Congress could adopt one extreme policy that would be
supplanted by another extreme policy by a Federalist majority in a subsequent Congress.
A non-institutional approach to the problem of instability under pure majoritarian
decision making is to introduce plausible restrictions on decision making that limit the
possible departures from the status quo and allow for a bounded set of equilibrium
outcomes to emerge. One refinement in this literature is to restrict attention to the set of
policy outcomes that lie in the "uncovered set".4 However, McKelvey (1986) proves that
the upper bound of the uncovered set increases both with the distance between the
preferred points of decision makers (one aspect of polarization) and with the number of
heterogeneous decision makers or voters (a second aspect of polarization).  That is, if one
accepts that political decisions are confined to the uncovered set, one can conclude that
polarization enables larger changes in government policy than would otherwise occur.
It is straightforward to argue, given these analyses, that polarization exposes
economic actors to greater risk of substantial departures from existing government
policies, even in an environment where there are multiple government decision makers.
Such departures might include dramatically increased tax rates; expropriation; withdrawal
of recognition for particular types of contracts; withdrawal of state protection of property
4 A policy  alternative  y is said  to cover a policy  choice  x if a majority  prefers  y to x and if the points that a
majority  prefers  toy forn a proper subset  of the points  that a majority  prefers  to x. Uncovered  policies  are
intuitively  more attractive  to political  agents,  which  provides  the concept  with some  plausibility. If
platform  y covers  platform  x, candidates  for election  would  always  prefer  platform  y, since  not only  does  y
defeat  x, but all the policies  that defeat  y also  defeat  x. Policy choices  inside  the uncovered  set defeat  all
policy  choices  outside  the uncovered  set, but policy  choices  inside  the uncovered  set can be defeated  by
other  points  inside  the set. Hence,  if the size of the uncovered  set expands,  uncertainty  about policy
outcomes  should  grow.
6rights  against  encroachment  by other  third  parties; or wide swings  in regulatory
requirements  with which  firms  are required  to be in compliance.
Finns, in turn, are likely  to change  their production  and investment  strategies  to
mitigate  this risk. For example,  they adopt  less efficient  production  processes  in order  to
reduce  their commitment  of fixed  capital  assets that  would  be vulnerable  to devaluation
or expropriation  as a consequence  of governmnent  policies;  they forego  the manufacture  of
products  for which  demand  is high but which  require  the use of such capital  assets; or
they reduce  the scale of their operation  altogether. It is well-established  that insecurity  of
property  and contract  rights reduces  growth  (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995). The
focus of this paper  is whether  polarization  substantially  increases  this insecurity,  and
through  that channel  reduces  economic  growth.
Measuring  Polarization
Testing  the links between  polarization  and economic  outcomes  is difficult  for
several  reasons. First, empirical  measures  of social  polarization  are scarce. In this
section,  we explain  the potential  and limitations  of several  available  measures  of social
polarization.  Second,  our argument  is premised  on the notion  that social polarization  is
reflected  in political  polarization;  cross-country  measures  of political  polarization  are
non-existent,  however. This is not as severe  a drawback  as it appears: to the extent  that
social polarization  is entirely  unrelated  to political  polarization,  and our maintained
hypothesis  is false,  we would  expect  the empirical  tests that we report to be uniformly
insignificant.
Although  most of the social polarization  measures  that we use here - income  and
land  inequality,  and ethnic and linguistic  fractionalization  - have  been used in other
contexts  in the literature,  previous  research  has not explained  how  well these measures
capture  theoretical  notions  of polarization.  In this section  we review  the theoretical
characteristics  of an ideal indicator  of social polarization  and assess  the polarization
7measures that are most frequently used in the literature.  Not surprisingly, we find that no
measure is perfect, but we do argue that our measures are good proxies.
Esteban and Ray (1994, p. 824) offer the most persuasive and rigorously
developed definition of polarization.  They argue that groups in society are polarized with
respect to any set of attributes when they exhibit the following three characteristics: the
members of each group are homogeneous with respect to the set of attributes; different
groups are heterogeneous with respect to these attributes; and the groups are relatively
uniform in size. Esteban and Ray conclude that polarization is greatest when society is
divided into two similarly sized groups, each internally homogeneous but significantly
different from the others on all possible attributes.
According to this definition, then, empirical measures of polarization should
account for the distance between groups with respect to particular policy preferences, the
homogeneity of group members with respect to these policies, and the relative size of the
groups.  Data that capture all of these dimensions are not available, especially on a cross-
country basis, but not even within individual countries. In our empirical tests below, we
therefore turn to proxies for which data are available: ethnic divisions and income and
land inequality.  Ethnic measures of polarization are commonly used in the literature.
However, for a number of reasons it is also important to test hypotheses related to social
polarization along other dimensions, as well, such as inequality. First, it is important to
use multiple measures to establish confidence in results.  Second, there is no conceptual
justification for testing polarization hypotheses by considering only ethnic or linguistic
dimensions of social differences but ignoring income differences.
Use of these data rests on two assumptions.  The argument of the paper is that
polarization makes it more likely that governments will adopt extreme policies.  Such
polarization is with respect to policy issues, however.  The first assumption, then, is that
people in different ethnic, income or asset groupings have different preferences over
policies; the more divided are people along these (observed) lines, therefore, the more
8polarized are their (unobserved) preferences with respect to policies.  So, for example, we
would expect increasing income inequality to increase polarization with respect to
bankruptcy law and time limits governing patent protection, while ethnic fragmentation
might lead to polarization with respect to regional development and civil service reform.
There are striking examples that support this assumption:  inter-ethnic competition in
Indonesia between the Chinese and Javans is rooted in the economic success of the
former and the economic rules of the game; in Nigeria, conflict between rival ethnic
groups is driven in large measure by the desire to control the country's oil wealth.
Second, we assume that departures in these variables from the three dimensions of
polarization defined by Esteban and Ray are sufficiently mild as to allow their use as
proxy measures of social polarization.  In the two subsections that follow, we describe the
data and argue that they are sufficiently close to the notions of polarization with which
we are concerned.  Note that to the extent that they are imperfect proxies, they introduce
noise into the statistical tests that makes it less likely that the empirical tests would offer
support for the hypotheses outlined above.
Ethnic  divisions and polarization
The first set of polarization variables measures ethnic divisions.  One of these
variables is "ethnic tensions", a subjective variable contained in the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), published by Political Risk Services, Inc.  This guide is marketed
primarily to overseas investors, and assigns numerical scores to various dimensions of
political risk.  "Ethnic tensions" is rated on a 0-6 scale, with larger values indicating
greater tensions.  We use the earliest value (from 1982, in most cases) of  "ethnic
tensions" for each country in our empirical tests.  We assume that countries with high
values of this variable are more polarized with respect to those policies that could
differentially affect ethnic groups.  Ethnic polarization, as defined by Esteban and Ray,
9should result in ethnic tensions; by construction, therefore, this measure of social
polarization meets the Esteban and Ray criteria.
A second variable, from Sullivan (1991), measures the percent of a country's
population belonging to the largest ethnic group.  A lower score therefore indicates a
more ethnically divided country.  Ethnicity is defined by language, race, and/or religion,
depending on which of these is viewed by Sullivan as the most relevant source of
divisions within the society. 5 This measure of ethnic heterogeneity captures well one
particular dimension of the Esteban and Ray polarization definition, related to the relative
size of groups. It diverges from their definition in two ways.
First, it does not capture the distance between ethnic group policy preferences.
However, it is unlikely that there is a systematic relationship between the (unmeasured)
extent of heterogeneity across groups with respect to their policy preferences and the
(measured) extent of ethnic fragmentation.  If the relationship is random, it only injects
noise into the estimation, making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis.
Second, the Sullivan measure of ethnic homogeneity falls monotonically as ethnic
fragmentation increases.  If one takes ethnic homogeneity as a measure for polarization,
though, this implies that polarization rises monotonically with ethnic fragmentation.
Such a relationship is inconsistent with theoretical notions of polarization.  Horowitz
(1985, pp. 37-4 1) and Esteban and Ray (1994, p. 624) argue that polarization should be
higher when there are a small number of large groups (e.g., as in Bosnia or Fiji) and
lower where there is a proliferation of very small groups (as in Tanzania). That is, as the
size of the largest group falls from 100 percent, tensions at first increase; beyond some
5 A third ethnicity  variable,  an index  of " ethno-linguistic  fractionalization"  reported  in Taylor  and Hudson
(1983),  has been  widely  used in the economics  and political  science  literature.  The Sullivan  measure  has
substantially  greater  country  coverage,  as the fractionalization  index is not reported  for many African  and
other  countries  which  were not yet independent  when  the variable  was constructed  in about 1960. The
homogeneity  variable  and  the fractionalization  index  are correlated  at -.60. In tests  below,  we report
results  using  the Sullivan  measure. In every case,  when  the fractionalization  index is substituted,  the
direction  of effects is similar,  although  it is less  often  statistically  significant.
10point, however, as the largest group becomes small, further declines in its size diminish
tensions.  To take this non-linearity into account, we allow the Sullivan measure to enter
both linearly and quadratically in the regressions.
Regressing the 6-point  "ethnic tensions" scale on the ethnic homogeneity
measure and the square of the measure supports this interpretation. The maximum
predicted level of tensions occurs when 42 percent of the population belongs to the
largest group.  Guyana and Trinidad exemplify this pattern: both score 6 on ethnic
tensions.  East Indians comprise 51 percent and Africans 30 percent of the population in
Guyana, and 40 percent and 43 percent of the population, respectively, in Trinidad.
Inequality as a proxy for polarization
The use of income inequality as a proxy for polarization has a long history.  James
Madison in Federalist no. 10 argued that ". . the most common and durable source of
factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.  Those who hold and
those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society."  More
recently, Berg and Sachs (1988), Haggard and Webb (1993), and Birdsall, Sabot, and
Ross (1995) have asserted that unequal income distributions contribute to social and
political polarization, and show empirically that inequality undermines the consensus for
needed policy reforms.  Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1995) suggest that government
capacity to take actions that minimize the long-term disruptive impact of exogenous
shocks increases if it enjoys the broad-based legitimacy that equality confers.
There are two possible problems with using inequality data as a measure of
polarization.  The first relates to its degree of convergence with theoretical notions of
polarization; the second relates to the quality of this data generally.  Both of these issues
are addressed in this section.
As Esteban and Ray make clear, theoretically appropriate measures of income-
based polarization should be sensitive to the degree of clustering of the population.
11Measures  of income  inequality  do not display  this sensitivity. They provide  a simple
example  that demonstrates  this. Begin with a society  of peasants  with identical  incomes.
Then  take a fixed  amount  of total income and redistribute  it to a fraction  of these
peasants. Polarization  would  rise and then  fall as this fraction  went from one to zero
(since  for values close  to zero or one, the vast majority  of the society  would  still have  the
same income). In contrast,  the Gini coefficient  for this society  would systematically  rise
(measured  inequality  would  become  more severe)  as this fraction  fell from one to zero.
However,  while  measures  of income  inequality  diverge  in potentially  significant
ways  from measures  of income-based  polarization,  there is evidence  that these
divergences  are more theoretical  than actual. For some  countries  (too few, unfortunately,
to be useful  for our empirical  tests below),  there are data that  permit us to observe
clustering  of the population  at different  income  levels (Chen,  Datt and Ravallion, 1994).
These data  allow us to calculate  a measure  of income-based  polarization  using the
formula  devised  by Esteban  and Ray. 6 The Chen,  et al. data include  the percent of the
population  that consumes  less  than $21,  $30, $40, $50 and $60/month. One can
extrapolate  from this data  the average  consumption  per person  per month of the
remaining  fraction  of the population  and then, using the formula  from Esteban  and Ray,
derive  measures  of polarization  for these countries. The resulting  measures  are positively
and strongly  correlated  with the Gini coefficient  calculated  from the same  data,
6 Esteban  and Ray  prove that  only this formula  provides  a measure  of polarization  consistent  with  their
n  n
three criteria: P =E  rl+a  ry|-yiI,where  there are n groups,  where  the ith group  has
income  yi and population  7rj. The formula  also includes  an unobservable  parameter,  a, which  represents
the "strength  of group  identity," or intra-group  homogeneity.  Esteban  and Ray  prove  that a must range
between  0 and 1.6.
12suggesting  that, in practice,  the Gini coefficient  is an appropriate  proxy for income-based
polarization  in society. 7
The quality  of income inequality  data is a second  concern. We use a recent
compilation  of income  inequality  data from Deininger  and Squire (1996). This dataset
has greater  coverage  over time and across  countries  than any previous  compilation.  In
addition,  and more importantly,  they identify  a "high quality"  subset  of observations.
Deininger  and Squire  conclude  that many observations  in previous  compilations  fail to
meet the minimum  standards  of quality  required  for inclusion  in their dataset.
To be included,  observations  must first be based on actual surveys  of households
excluding,  for example,  observations  derived from national  accounts  data on sources  of
income  coupled  with some  assumption  about  how different  types of income  are
distributed. Second,  observations  must be based on a representative  sample  of the
nation's population. This excludes  observations  based on surveys  covering  only urban or
rural  populations,  for example. Finally,  observations  must be based  on comprehensive
coverage  of incomes  sources,  excluding,  for example,  observations  based  only on wages.
Deininger  and Squire  assess  three other  quality  problems  that afflict all inequality
datasets. First, for some  observations  income  is measured  for households  and for others,
individuals. This difference  appears  to matter little. For those cases  with data on both,
the Gini coefficient  averages  only 1.7  points higher when it is calculated  using
individuals  as income  recipients. Second,  they include  income  observations  that are
measured  either  gross  or net of taxes. Where  measures  of both are available,  Ginis based
on pre-tax  incomes  are on average  about 2.7 points  higher.
7 We calculated  the polarization  measure  using four different  values  of the unobservable  constant  a (the
minimum  allowable  value,  0, the maximum  allowable,  1.6,  as well as 0.3 and 0.7). The  resulting  values  of
polarization  are always  positively  correlated  with  the Gini coefficient,  which is most important  for the
purposes  of this  paper. The correlation  with Gini  ranges  from very  strong  (.75 for a equal  to 0 and .3) to a
weaker  but still  significant  .37 (for  a = 1.6).
13Finally,  all existing  sizeable  compilations  of inequality  data include both income-
based and expenditure-based  measures. In the Deininger-Squire  dataset,  where  both are
available,  income-based  Ginis average  6.6 points  higher than expenditure-based  Ginis.
They accordingly  recommend  that any empirical  results resting  on cross-national
variations  in Gini be tested for their robustness  to an adjustment  for differences  in
expenditure-based  and income-based  measures. We do this, and find that adding  this 6.6
mean difference  to the observations  that are based  on expenditures  does not materially
change  any of the empirical  results we report  below.
The Deininger-Squire  "high-quality"  dataset contains  multiple  observations  for
income  inequality  for many countries. For empirical  tests in which we examine
inequality's  impact  on property  rights for the 1986-95  period,  we chose  inequality
observations  as close to 1985  as possible. The mean year  for observations  is 1985,  with a
standard  deviation  of 4.8 years. To analyze  the effect  of inequality  on growth over the
1970-92  period,  we selected  observations  as close  to 1970  as possible,  with a mean year
of 1971  and a standard  deviation  of 4.3 years.
Societies  can also be polarized  according  to holdings  of assets. Land inequality  is
the only measure  of asset inequality  with broad  country  coverage. Gini coefficients  for
land inequality  circa 1960  and 1970  are available  from Taylor  and Jodice (1983);  Muller
and Seligson  (1987)  include  some  additional  values for circa 1970. Jazairy  et al. (1992)
report observations  for more recent  years  for many countries. As with the income
inequality  observations,  we created  two cross-sections,  one centered  around  the early
1980s  (based  primarily  on Jazairy),  and another  centered  around 1970  (based  primarily  on
Taylor  and Jodice). All of the land inequality  observations  are based  on official
agricultural  censuses  undertaken  by the UN Food  and Agriculture  Organization,  although
they have  not been  subjected  to the level of scrutiny  Deininger  and Squire  (1996)  have
applied  to income  inequality  data, raising  the possibility  of greater  measurement  error.
14Table Al  in the Data Appendix shows the simple correlations among all of the
polarization measures.  Low correlations between income and land inequality, and
between either of these and each of the ethnicity variables, suggest that societies are in
general polarized in different ways across different dimensions. This provides support
for our assumption that redistributive issues are unlikely to be unidimensional, and
underlines the importance of looking at multiple sources of polarization when
investigating the impact of polarization on economic and political outcomes, as we do
below.
Insecure  property  rights  and polarization
Our concern in this article is with the impact of polarization on those aspects of
government decision making that affect economic actors. For these actors, perhaps the
most important aspect of the policy environment is the reliability of a country's
guarantees of property and contract rights.  Polarization allows extreme departures from
these guarantees (for example, against expropriation, to honor contracts with private
firms, or for assigning liability in the event of disputes in the private sector), as it allows
extreme departures from government policies generally. 8 Testing this hypothesis is the
focus of the discussion below.9
Measuring Property Rights
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) produces five indicators that
specifically evaluate the credibility and predictability of property and contractual rights in
a large number of countries: Expropriation Risk, Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by
Government, Rule of Law, Quality of the Bureaucracy, and Corruption in Government.
8 Increasing  polarization  need not affect liability  laws  or expropriation  directly  to undermine  investor
confidence. Given  high  polarization  on other  margins  (say, regarding  national  defense),  the potential  of
tradeoffs  and logrolling  across  policy  dimensions  makes  all other  policies  vulnerable  to change.
9 A more  direct  hypothesis,  that government  policies  are more  volatile  when  polarization  increases,  cannot
be tested  because  of a lack of data on the volatility  of government  economic  and regulatory  policies.
15The Data Appendix provides the criteria used by ICRG in assessing countries on each of
these five variables.
We use an additive index of these indicators.'I  The latter three of the five listed
above were re-scaled from 6-point to 10  -point scales for comparability with the former
two.  Higher scores are always "better", reflecting lower risks, stronger rule of law,
higher quality bureaucracy and lower corruption.  The index has a maximum possible
value of 50 and a minimum of 0.
The relationship between the first three components of the index (expropriation,
repudiation of contracts, rule of law) and the security of property rights is
straightforward. High scores on bureaucratic quality are assigned to countries where the
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy--
the predictability of policy under bureaucratic control is an explicit coding criterion.
Corruption is somewhat more ambiguous, since corrupt arrangements may be predictable
(where, for example, it is widely known that no decision is made unless the minister
receives a ten percent commission).  In general, though, corruption is likely to be
associated with greater uncertainty among economic actors, since corrupt arrangements
are generally not legally enforceable.  The results we report below are robust to deleting
corruption and/or bureaucratic quality from the index.
An important characteristic of the ICRG index is that it measures the insecurity of
property rights rather than the allocation of rights (unlike indicators of fiscal
redistribution, for example).  Weak rule of law, the absence of constraints on government
repudiation of contracts, and the ability of bureaucracies to act arbitrarily all undermine
the security of property rights, independent of the level of redistribution in a society.
10  This  additive  index  is cofrelated  at about .99  with indexes  using  weights  obtained  from factor  analyses.
Correlations  among  the five components  of the index range from .68 to .88. The index  has a high degree
of reliability,  with a Cronbach's  alpha  of .94. For further  information  on these property  rights variables  see
Knack  and Keefer  (1995),  in which  they are found  to be important  determinants  of economic  performance.
The ICRG  dataset  we use is available  for a nominal  fee from the PRS Group  (www.prsgroup.com).
16Values of the property rights index for Singapore and Sweden illustrate this crucial
conceptual difference.
Government spending as a share of GDP in Sweden is more than double what it is
in Singapore, suggesting significantly more redistribution in Sweden.  If the property
rights index only measured the level of redistribution in a society, then Singapore should
have a considerably higher score on the property rights index than Sweden.  However, if
the index measures the security of property rights, the values of Singapore and Sweden
should be similar or somewhat higher in Sweden, where there are more formal constraints
on government action.  In fact, the index scores for Singapore and Sweden (averaged for
the 1986-95 period) are 43.0 and 49.4, respectively, just as one would expect if the ICRG
index reflects the security rather than the allocation of property rights.
The validity of the index is further supported by its correlation with other, similar
variables.  This ICRG property rights index is highly correlated (.9) with an alternative
one constructed from data provided by a second investor risk service, Business
Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), using this service's measures of contract
enforceability, risk of nationalization, and bureaucratic delays.  Rauch and Evans (2000)
find that the ICRG and BERI bureaucracy and corruption measures are strongly predicted
by such measures of efficient bureaucratic structure as meritocratic recruitment and
promotion.'  1
The Impact of Polarization on Property Rights
Table 1 reports the results of our investigation of the effect of polarization on the
security of property rights, using the four different proxies for polarization in the different
II  The ICRG  bureaucracy  and corruption  measures  are also strongly  and negatively  correlated  across
countries  with  entrepreneurs'  perceptions  of uncertainty  in the way rules and laws are administered  by
bureaucracies  and the courts,  as measured  in a survey  conducted  for the World  Bank's 1997 World
Development  Report. Those  survey  measures  and the BERI index  are not used as dependent  variables
here  because  of the small  number  of countries  in their samples  with data on income  and land inequality,
relative  to the ICRG sample.
17specifications.  The dependent  variable  is the index of the security  of property  rights,
averaged  over the 1986-95  period. There are three  control variables. Given  the costs of
setting  up institutions  for protection  of private  property  and the enforcement  of contracts,
institutional  development  may be a function  of the size and volume  of market
transactions  (Rosenberg  and Birdzell,  1986). Thus, per capita  GDP and  aggregate  GDP
(as a fraction  of U.S. aggregate  GDP) are taken into account. Controlling  for a third
variable,  recent growth  of per capita income,  is intended  to capture  any bias in the
subjective  evaluations  of property  rights,  which conceivably  are influenced  by recent
economic  performance.
Results  presented  in Table 1 support  the argument  that  polarization  undermines
the security  of property  rights.' 2 The polarization  coefficients  all have the expected  signs
and indicate  large effects. The coefficient  on income  inequality  (equation  1) is significant
at the .01 level,  and each 5-point  rise in Gini is associated  with a decline  in the ICRG
index of nearly 1  point. Each standard  deviation  increase  in income  inequality  (i.e. of
9.4) reduces  the property  rights index by about  one-sixth  of a standard  deviation  (i.e. by
1.6). The impact  of land inequality  in equation  2 is significant  at the .05 level for a one-
tailed test. Each 10-point  rise in the Gini for land  inequality  is associated  with a nearly 1-
point drop in the ICRG index. A one standard  deviation  increase  in land inequality  (i.e.
of 16.3)  is associated  with a 1.5-point  drop  in the property  rights  index.
Another  way to examine  whether  land  inequality  is a source  of polarization  is to
evaluate  whether  its effect  is more  pronounced,  as it should  be, in countries  where a
larger fraction  of the labor  force is dedicated  to agriculture  (and therefore,  where land is
relatively  more important  than other assets).' 3 We find that it is. An interaction  term
between  land  inequality  and agricultural  labor  force added  to equation  2 of Table 1 is
12  Svensson  (1998)  reports  a similar  regression  using income  inequality,  but not the other  three measures.
13  Russett  (1964)  makes a similar  point  in the context  of political  violence.
18significant at the .05 level (in a two-tailed test). Moreover, where virtually none of the
labor force is in agriculture (the UK, Kuwait, and Singapore have the lowest values in the
sample at two percent), land inequality has no effect on property rights, while the effect
in nations with 80 percent of the labor force in agriculture (Niger, at 92 percent, has the
highest value) is double the average effect in the whole sample.'4
"Ethnic tensions" is a highly significant determinant of property rights in equation
3, with each 1-point rise in the 6-point scale associated with a drop of 1.2 points in the
50-point property rights indicator. The coefficients on ethnic homogeneity in equation 4
are nearly significant at conventional levels, and show a non-linear relationship with
property rights, as expected.  Property rights worsen until the largest group exceeds 64
percent of the population, when rights begin to improve.
Even when they are included together, the differing measures of polarization
continue to exhibit the predicted effect on property rights.  In equation 5,  income
inequality, land inequality, and "ethnic tensions" each have a negative and significant
independent effect on the security of property rights.  In equation 6, the coefficients for
ethnic homogeneity and its square both increase in absolute value relative to equation 4,
and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  Land inequality remains significant,
while income inequality loses its significance.
Testing the robustness ofpolarization  's effects on the security ofproperty  rights
Table 2 summarizes the robustness of the key results from Table 1 to various
changes in specification, sample or method.  The table shows (only) the new coefficients
and standard errors for the polarization variables from tests very similar to those in
equations 1-3 in Table 1, but after the indicated change in specification, sample or
method has been made.
14 Detailed results available on request from authors.
19The first robustness check is in response to the possible claim that the primary
effect of polarization is actually to increase levels of political violence.  It would therefore
be political violence that leads to declines in property rights security and
creditworthiness.  This is not the case, however.  When the frequencies of revolutions,
coups and assassinations are added as regressors, as in the first row of Table 2, the
estimated effects of polarization change very little.  15 The effects of political violence on
property rights are generally negative, as anticipated, but are not statistically significant.
A second possible concern arises from the influence of regime type.  Democracies
may tend to have both more equal income distributions and more secure property rights.
This would potentially make the measured effects of inequality on property rights in
Table 1 spurious. To control for this, we add a dummy variable for regime type.
Democracies do exhibit more secure property rights on average (5 to 9 points higher on a
50 point scale), but as shown in the second row of Table 2, accounting for regime type
has little effect on the polarization results.1 6 The negative effect of land inequality
actually increases slightly and the effect of income inequality is still significant at .05 for
a 1-tailed test.
It might also be argued that omitted variables specific to each continent account
for the results.  However, when continent dummies for Latin America and Africa are
added as regressors, all measures of polarization remain negative, income inequality is
statistically significant and the association of "ethnic tensions" with property rights
strengthens substantially.  These results are shown in the third row of Table 2.  The
influence of land inequality declines by two-thirds.  This is unsurprising, since Latin
15 Values  are annual averages  for the 1980s,  with  data from Banks  (1993).  These are the violence  measures
used  by Barro  (1991).
16 Clague  et al. (1996)  conclude  that democracies  have more  secure  property  rights  than most autocracies.
The dummy  variable  for regime  type used here is constructed  as follows: democracies  are countries
scoring  no more  than four on the sum of the Freedom  House  indices  of political  freedoms  and civil  liberties
for 1986  (from  Gastil, 1986).
20America has a large share of the countries that exhibit both highly unequal distribution of
land and insecure property rights.  Moreover, this association is unlikely to be the
spurious product of some unobserved variable characteristic of Latin America and no
other continent.  In particular, the argument that the relationship between land
distribution and insecure property rights is spurious cannot explain the result reported
earlier, that the impact of land inequality increases with the size of the agricultural labor
force, as our theory predicts.
Measurement error might also be driving our results, although we rely on the best
available compilation of income inequality data.  To control for this, we use weighted
least squares (WLS), utilizing as weights the log of per capita income as a proxy for data
quality.17 This procedures changes the polarization coefficients change by very little, as
shown in the fourth row of Table 2.  Finally, to ensure that these results are not the
product of a few influential observations we employ two standard methods:  median
regression, which is based on minimizing the sum of absolute residuals rather than the
sum of squared residuals, and robust regression, in which observations with larger
residuals are downweighted. In most cases, the effect of these techniques is to increase
the polarization coefficients, as displayed in the bottom two rows of Table 2.
Links between inequality and economic performance
The prior section demonstrates a strong and robust relationship between various
measures of polarization and the security of property rights.  Other work has
demonstrated a link between property rights and economic growth (for example, see
Knack and Keefer, 1995) and between inequality and long-run growth (Alesina and
Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Clarke, 1995).18 The findings in Table 1 raise
17 Summers  and Heston  (1991, p. 341)  report that  the margin  of error in  their estimates  of real gross
domestic  product  is much lower  for richer  than for poorer countries.
18  Studies  examining  shorter  periods,  such as decades,  tend to find weaker  relationships  between  income
inequality  and growth  (Barro,  2000). The relationship  even changes  sign  when estimates  are based solely
21the possibility of a previously unexplored channel through which inequality might affect
growth: through its negative influence on the security of property rights.  This issue is the
subject of this section, which focuses on our income inequality measure of polarization,
since among various polarization measures income inequality has commanded nearly
universal attention in research on the determinants of growth.
Other explanations linking  inequality and growth
No complete explanation yet exists to explain how inequality affects growth.
Four arguments have been the subject of the most thorough empirical research.  These
relate to imperfect capital markets, the size of the market, the politics of redistribution,
and political violence.  We review each of these and then turn to the tests of the
explanation advanced in this paper.
Benabou (1996) and others argue that when capital markets are imperfect, credit
applicants who are poor but have high expected rate of return projects (such as
investment in their own human capital) have less access to credit than rich applicants with
the same or worse quality projects.  Rising inequality reduces the number of people with
access to credit markets, excluding many good projects from funding, thereby lowering
growth.'9 Consistent with the key assumption of this theory, Deininger and Squire (1998)
find that countries with higher income inequality have lower rates of educational
attainment.  Because capital markets tend to be less developed (less perfect) in poor
countries than in rich, the theory also implies that the effects of inequality on growth
should be worse in poor countries than in rich.  Deininger and Squire find that land
on within-country  variation  over  time (Forbes,  forthcoming),  a method  particularly  sensitive  to
measurement  error in the inequality  data, as noted by Barro  (2000). The effects  of polarization  via
property  rights  on growth  involve  longer-run  processes;  therefore  our empirical  tests  in this section  follow
Persson  and Tabellini  (1994) and Alesina  and Rodrik  (1994) in using  long-run  averages  with one
observation  per country.
19 Note that credit  markets  are built on contractual  relationships  that are likely  to be less  reliable in more
polarized  countries. That is, polarization  should increase  the imperfections  in capital  markets  in  the same
way that it makes  other  property  and contractual  rights  less  reliable.
22inequality reduces growth more in low income countries.  However, the effects of income
inequality on growth do not differ across high and low income countries.  Moreover,
contrary to the theory, Perotti (1996) finds that income inequality affects school
enrollment more in rich countries than in poor countries.
A second argument relates to the size of the market.  Murphy, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1989) argue that successful industrialization depends on large markets comprised
of middle and upper class consumers, which enable manufacturers to justify technologies
with increasing returns to scale.  In countries where trade barriers or high fixed costs to
exporting make international markets more difficult to penetrate, successful
industrialization may therefore depend on the existence of a sizeable middle class in the
local market.. They cite historical evidence from the U.S. in support of their model.
Closer investigation reveals only slight cross-country support for their thesis,
however.  Their hypothesis implies that the negative effects of inequality on growth
should be greater in smaller markets, since in larger markets the absolute size of the
middle and upper classes is large even if income inequality is severe.  Markets are small
when both the domestic market is small and there are barriers to trade.  We find that the
size of an economy (as measured by aggregate GDP) does have a stronger effect on
growth in countries with high trade barriers than in countries with low trade barriers, but
this difference is small and not statistically significant. Similarly, as these authors
predict, we find that income inequality has a stronger negative effect on growth in
countries with small markets, but again the effect is small and statistically insignificant.
Land inequality, on the other hand, has the same impact in small and large market
countries, contrary to their hypothesis. 20
20 These  results  are available  from the authors upon request.  Moreover, other empirical evidence
(Helliwell, 1994) indicates that the direct effects on growth of market size are very modest in strength.
23A third channel  through  which inequality  is believed  to reduce  growth  is through
income  redistribution,  particularly  in democracies. This hypothesis  has venerable  roots.
James  Madison  wrote in Federalist  Paper  No. 10  that ". . democracies.  ..have  ever been
found incompatible  with personal  security  or the rights  of property;  and have in general
been as short in their lives as they have been  violent in their deaths." Somewhat  more
recent  analysis  has formalized  this early intuition. Meltzer  and Richard  (1981)  show
theoretically  that the level of income  tax preferred  by the majority  of voters increases
with the degree  of income  inequality. Alesina  and Rodrik  (1994)  and Persson  and
Tabellini  (1994)  extend  these  findings  to develop  hypotheses  that countries  with higher
levels of inequality  should  experience  lower  growth. In their models,  when inequality  is
severe  governments  face greater  pressures  to redistribute  income  from those who  have
invested  most,  or have the greatest  ability,  to those  who  have invested  less or have less
ability. The policy  of redistribution  is predictable  and does not change  unless  the level of
inequality  itself changes. 21 In this paper, government  policies  change  even if the level of
inequality  is constant,  and those  changes  can be large if inequality  is high.
Two tests have  been used  to examine  this proposition. Persson  and Tabellini
(1994)  hypothesize  that pressures  for redistribution  are likely  to be more pronounced  in
democracies  than in autocracies.  Alesina  and Rodrik  (1994)  and Deininger  and Squire
(1998) find no empirical  support  for this hypothesis  in cross-country  tests. 22 The second
test focuses  on whether  transfer  payments  rise when inequality  grows. Using a variety of
measures  of redistribution,  Perotti  (1996)  finds no evidence  of a positive relationship
21 In their models,  redistribution  policy  is instantaneously  adopted  and constant  over  time (in part to ensure
time consistency).  They  suggest  that  the redistribution  argument  can be recast in  terms of property  rights.
Our argument  is that  there is an important  difference  between  an unfavorable  allocation  of property  rights
to those with  high ability,  which  is consistent  with  a known  policy  of redistribution,  and an uncertain
allocation  of property  rights,  which  is not and which  is the focus  of this  paper.
22 Knack  and Keefer  (1997)  show that  the stronger  impact  of inequality  on growth in democracies
demonstrated  by Persson  and Tabellini  (1994) is an artifact  of their regime  type classifications  and
measurement  error in their inequality  data.
24between redistribution and income inequality in democracies, contrary to the predictions
of the median voter models. 23 Moreover, he uncovers no cross-country evidence that
higher levels of fiscal redistribution are harmful to growth.
The fourth strand of analysis linking polarization and growth focuses on political
violence and instability.  Substantial evidence indicates that both political violence and
inequality retard growth, but there is no conclusive evidence that inequality leads to
violence. 24 Findings in the literature of positive correlations between inequality and
violence prove to be sensitive to model specification, to the particular violence measure
used, and to the inclusion of inequality observations of suspect quality. 25 For example,
Perotti (1996) reports that income inequality worsens his index of political violence and
that violence in turn is significantly and negatively associated with growth rates over the
1960-85 period.  Using nearly identical data, Alesina and Perotti (1996) demonstrate
similar links among inequality, political violence and investment rates.  However, when
we replicate these models with the Deininger-Squire compilation of inequality data, we
find no link between inequality and violence.  Perotti finds that the share of income of the
middle class has a highly significant (t = 2.1) effect on political violence. Substituting
the Deininger-Squire data set of income inequality, but otherwise using Perotti's data, we
find that the coefficient on inequality plummets and is insignificant (t = .58).26
23 Persson  and Tabellini  suggest  that transfer  payments  are not a sufficient  test of their model,  since
redistribution  can take place through  non-fiscal  means as well. However,  it seems  probable  that the median
voter  would  be more  decisive  in debates  over  the govermment  budget,  which  are most often  conducted  in
legislatures,  than over other  redistributive  issues,  such  as eminent  domain  proceedings  or regulatory
hearings,  which  are conducted  in regulatory  agencies  and  courts,  over  which  legislatures  (and  therefore  the
median  voter)  have less  direct  influence.
24 Barro (1991)  among  others  has found  evidence  that political  violence  and instability  curtail growth,
although  Alesina  et al. (1996)  find that coups  are in turn inspired  by poor economic  performance.
25 See Wang  et al. (1993)  and citations  therein  for a sample  of this literature.
26 Detailed  results  are not reported  here for space  reasons,  but are available  upon  request.
25The prediction that polarization worsens political violence is nevertheless
intuitively appealing. Its relationship with inequality may be weak because inequality
does not forge sufficiently high levels of group cohesion and identification necessary to
overcome the considerable collective action problems entailed in organizing violence for
political ends.  It is possible that ethnic divisions forge stronger links within groups, and
are more associated with political violence than is inequality, but a test of this speculation
is outside the scope of this paper and must remain a topic for future research.
Property rights, inequality, and growth - the polarization link
Insecure property and contractual rights can affect growth directly, by influencing
the choice of production process and the efficiency with which production is carried out,
and indirectly, by reducing incentives to invest (see Barro, 1991 and Knack and Keefer,
1995 for a fuller discussion of this relationship).  If inequality operates principally
through the security of property rights in reducing growth, then the independent effect of
inequality on growth should diminish substantially after controlling explicitly for the
security of property rights.  On the other hand, if inequality operates primarily through
high, but certain, levels of redistribution, we would not expect large changes in the
coefficient on inequality after controlling for the security of property rights.
The dependent variable in Table 3 is average annual growth in per capita income over the
1970-90 period. Following Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994),
regressors include beginning-year (1970) per capita income, a measure of human capital
(mean years of education completed for 1970; data are from Barro and Lee [1993]), and
inequality.  Following Alesina and Rodrik (1994), we use Gini coefficients for income
and land inequality as inequality measures. However, we use the Deininger-Squire
income inequality dataset, which was unavailable to them.  All inequality observations
used in these tests are from 1980 or earlier, to minimize the possibility of reverse
26causation.  Following Knack and Keefer (1995), we use the earliest available
observations of the ICRG property rights index.
Results are displayed in Table 3.  Growth is positively related to educational
attainment, and negatively related to initial income, the conditional convergence result
found by Barro (1991) and others.  Income inequality is negatively associated with
growth, while the property rights index is positively associated with growth.
The critical result in Table 3 is that the addition of the property rights index
substantially reduces the inequality coefficients, by nearly one-half in the case of income
inequality (comparing equations 1 and 3), and by one-third for land inequality (equations
4 and 6).  By way of comparison, the inequality coefficients do not consistently or
substantially diminish when a similar experiment is conducted with indexes of violence
and instability. For income inequality, an F test shows the coefficient on income
inequality in equation 3 is significantly lower than its equation 1 value (using a one-tailed
test). This evidence supports the conclusion that property rights is an important channel
through which income polarization affects growth.  However, it makes clear as well that
other channels also matter, as indicated by the fact that the inequality coefficients remain
negative, and significant in the case of land inequality.
Conclusion
The key observation of this paper is that polarization makes large changes in
current policies, including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights,
more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements. This provides a simple and
previously unnoted explanation of such phenomena as the deterioration of property rights
security when inequality is high, and the negative effect of inequality on economic
growth. Our empirical results provide strong support for the argument that polarization
causes a deterioration in the security of property rights.  In addition, our results
27distinguish our explanation linking polarization and growth from previous explanations
that focus on redistribution.
The policy implications of these two approaches are quite distinct.  If
redistributive policies, per se, are to blame for the low growth engendered by inequality,
for example, governments that seek to mitigate income inequality in a society must
inevitably confront a trade-off between equity and growth. If, on the other hand, the
insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies,
then governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur
less risk of slowing economic growth. 27 Fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may
actually increase growth by reducing the risks of policy uncertainty.
27  Malaysia seems to have accomplished this in consistently granting formal economic privileges to the
indigenous bumiputera, or Malay, population over ethnic Chinese and Indian Malaysians.
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32Data Appendix
Table Al
Correlation Coefficients  for Polarization Measures
...  _  . _.  _  _  _  _  2  3  4
1. Gini  income inequality  .11  -.25*  .18
2. Gini land inequality  -.06  .04
3. Ethnic tensions  -.50**
4. Ethnic  homogeneity  I__  _
** indicates significant at .01 for two-tailed tests.
*  indicates significant  at .05 for two-tailed tests.
Table A2
Summary Statistics
I_______________  IMean  Std. dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Property rights index  30.4  10.2  9.8  50
Gini income inequality  41.9  9.4  25.2  63.0
Gini land inequality  54.9  16.3  8.0  97.2
Etnic  tensions  3.1  1.7  1  6
Ethnic homogeneity  68.4  25.4  17  100
hnequality  measures are circa 1985. Property rights index is averaged over 1986-95.
33Definitions of Property Rights Index components:
Quality of the Bureaucracy:
High scores indicate "autonomy from political pressure" and "strength  and expertise
to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services"; also
existence of an "established  mechanism for recruiting and training." Scored 0-6.
Corruption  in Government:
Lower scores indicate "high government officials are likely to  demand special
payments" and  "illegal payments  are  generally expected throughout lower  levels of
government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange
controls,  tax assessment,  police protection,  or loans." Scored 0-6.
Rule of Law:
This variable "reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to
accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes."
Higher scores indicate "sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions
for an orderly succession of power."  Lower scores indicate "a tradition of depending on
physical force or illegal means to settle claims." Upon changes in government in countries
scoring low on this measure, new leaders "may  be less likely to accept the obligations of the
previous regime."  Original variable name in ICRG is "law and order tradition."  Scored 0-
6.
Expropriation  of Private Investment:
Assessment of risk of "outright confiscation"  or "forced nationalization." Scored 0-
10, with lower scores for higher risks.
Repudiation of Contracts  by Government:
Indicates the "risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation,
postponement, or scaling down" due to "budget cutbacks, indigenization  pressure, a change
in government, or a change in government economic and social priorities."  Scored 0-10,
with lower scores for higher risks.
Property Rights Index:
Sum of 5 preceding variables, with the first 3 transformed into 10-point scales.
Where used  as  a  dependent variable, the  index is  averaged over  1986-95.  As  an
independent variable in growth regressions, the first available data point (1982 for most
countries) is used.
34Table 1
Polarization and Property Rights
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
Constant  -22.161  -27.915  -17.996  -21.955  -13.537  -17.961
(8.143)  (5.603)  (5.739)  (6.403)  (9.990)  (8.801)
Log 1985 GDP  7.646***  7.937***  6.515***  7.350***  7.610***  8.850***
per capita  (0.781)  (0.716)  (0.644)  (0.724)  (1.005)  (0.934)
Per capita  0.213  0.599*  0.405*  0.514**  0.145  0.232
growth 1980-85  (0.195)  (0.294)  (0.191)  (0.220)  (0.211)  (0.223)
Aggregate GDP,  0.036  0.071*  0.070*  0.072*  0.040  0.036
1985  (0.026)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.022)  (0.024)
Gini: income  -0.186***  -0.196**  -0.144
Inequality  (0.071)  (0.068)  (0.081)
Gini: land  -0.093  -0.097**  -0.076*
inequality  (0.048)  (0.032)  (0.034)
Ethnic Tensions  -1.21***  -0.935*
(0.337)  (0.395)
Ethnic  -0.243  -0.409*
homogeneity  (0.150)  (0.165)
homogeneity 2 .0019  .0031 **
(.0011)  (.0011)
Adj. R  .74  .70  .70  .67  .80  .80
N  76  85  108  107  64  64
Mean, D.V.  32.1  30.9  30.3  30.2  32.7  32.7
Dependent  variable  =  International  Country  Risk Guide  Index (ICRG), 1986-95. Inequality  measures
are circa 1985. Standard  errors are calculated  using  White's (1980)  heteroskedastic-consistent  variance-
covariance matrix.  A *,  **, or *** indicates significance at .05, .01, or .001 level respectively for two-
tailed tests.
35Table 2
Polarization and Property Rights:
Robustness to Additional Regressors
Polarization Variable:  Gini  Gini  Ethnic
income  land  tensions
Political violence as  -0.185**  -0.083  -1.069***
added regressor  (0.070)  (0.046)  (0.329)
Regime type dummy as  -0.128  -0.114**  -0.954***
added regressor  (0.075)  (0.041)  (0.310)
Continent dummies as  -0.182*  -0.033  -1.421***
added regressors  (0.081)  (0.051)  (0.306)
WLS (log of per capita  -0.198**  -0.081  -1.178***
GDP as weight)  (0.073)  (0.043)  (0.341)
Median regression  -0.215**  -0.113  -1.225*
(0.080)  (0.060)  (0.585)
Robust regression  -0.181 *  -0.128**  -1.208***
(0.078)  (0.044)  (0.369)
Each cell shows  regression  coefficient  and standard  error for the relevant  polarization  measure, changing
the specification  as noted, using  equations  1-3  in Tables 1 as base  regressions. A *, **, or *** indicates
significance  at .05, .01, or .001 respectively  for two-tailed  tests.
36Table 3
Inequality, Property Rights and Growth, 1970-92
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
Constant  10.691  12.064  13.117  5.377  5.796  6.461
(3.162)  (2.605)  (3.416)  (2.147)  (1.936)  (2.072)
Log 1970 GDP  -0.775  -1.734***  -1.652***  -0.352  -0.937**  -0.774**
Per capita  (0.388)  (0.452)  (0.447)  (0.269)  (0.284)  (0.282)
Mean years of  0.835  0.162  0.179  1.123***  0.680*  0.815*
education 1970  (0.432)  (0.539)  (0.497)  (0.305)  (0.333)  (0.354)
Gini: income  -0.088**  -0.046
inequality  (0.025)  (0.030)
Gini: land  -0.039**  -0.026*
Inequality  (0.012)  (0.012)
Property rights  0.140**  0.119**  0.080***  0.062*
Index, 1982  (0.027)  (0.033)  (0.023)  (0.025)
Adj. R 2 .20  .36  .39  .20  .22  .26
N  56  89
Mean, D.V.  1.83  1.37
The dependent  variable is average annual  growth of per capita income, 1970-92,  calculated  from
Summers  and Heston (1991).  Inequality  observations  are circa 1970. Standard  errors are calculated
using White's heteroskedastic-consistent variance-covariance matrix.  A *,  **, or *** indicates
significance  at .05, .01, or .001 level respectively  for two-tailed  tests.
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